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INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES & OTHER CRIMINAL COURTS: TEN
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WHERE WE Go FROM HERE AND How
TO GET THERE-LOOKING TO A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
DAVID ARONOFSKY'

INTRODUCTION

I am especially pleased to participate in the 2005 Sutton Colloquium,
"Protecting Human Rights: A Global Challenge." When Professor Nanda initially
contacted me about this opportunity, we discussed what I might contribute and we
decided it would be useful for me to review the various international war crimes
tribunals which have emerged since the Bosnia and Rwanda atrocities in the early
1990's. I willingly chose this topic because of my long-time intellectual interest in
bringing international war criminals and other international human rights violators
to justice.
Every year I show my University of Montana Public International Law
students the film Judgment at Nuremberg2 to illustrate why we must never again
allow a country's judicial system to help destroy the legal rights of people the
system is supposed to protect. This depiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal's trial of
Nazi Germany judges and prosecutors who used the law to facilitate the Holocaust
is a "must-see" for everyone interested in meting out justice to those who
themselves forgot they were required to do so. I am always amazed by how
American law students react when they learn what judges who become part of a
savage regime are capable of doing from the bench.
I have also shown Court Television's outstanding video of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) trial of Dusko Tadic to not
only my University of Montana law students, but also to Russian military academy
students from Central Asia who come to Montana for rule of law education and
training. These young cadets readily grasp the significance of what the ICTY was
created to do, namely subject military and paramilitary officials to international
law and justice principles. The Tadic video requires these young future military
leaders to think about how far they might be willing to go in straying from, or
alternatively, adhering to, well-established Geneva Convention rules and principles
applicable to their careers as professional soldiers. Our class discussions always
seem to generate multiple "teaching moments," or perhaps better stated, "learning

1.The author is General Counsel and an Adjunct Faculty Member in the Schools of Law and
Education at The University of Montana. The views expressed herein are solely the author's.
2. Judgment at Nuremberg (MGM 1961).
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moments," as these young people from countries with few modem law and justice
traditions grapple with what the video portrays.
My own intellectual curiosity regarding these tribunals became permanently
whetted when, during a visit to the ICTY a number of years ago, a senior ICTY
official asked my opinion on whether the ICTY endeavor was worth the effort and
cost. This was long before Slobodan Milosevic was hauled before the ICTY, and
the mood at The Hague seemed one of doubt. I thought about this question and
responded that it might well be worth the effort if even one war criminal were tried
and convicted, because this would set the stage for others to be tried either in The
Hague, or in some other court created to hear these cases. I further stated that the
Tadic case was probably only the beginning, with others surely to come. My
oldest daughter, a high school student who accompanied me on this ICTY visit,
asked me after we left why the world community would not try war criminals who
committed the Bosnian and Rwandan atrocities. Let me suggest that answering
such a question from a smart, idealistic adolescent is a difficult task.
In preparing for this year's Sutton Colloquium program, I reflected on all the
above experiences, as well as my own thinking about the state of international
criminal tribunals to date. Upon such reflection, I have reached a number of
conclusions, surprising even to myself, about where we go from here. I start with
the proposition that what we have seen thus far, beginning with the Nuremberg and
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, may reflect a well-meaning effort, but the world can
and must do better. I consider the International Criminal Court (ICC) a noble idea
which cannot achieve its purposes in any meaningful way as long as so many key
nations in the world refuse to participate, and more importantly, as long as
cooperation with ICC jurisdiction remains essentially voluntary and discretionary.
Instead, only the UN Security Council has the stature, and more importantly, the
power, to compel adjudication of all major international criminals in a manner
likely to inspire world confidence.
I have set forth below 10 specific
recommendations intended to provoke debate, and perhaps ultimately to provoke
changes, concerning, using a new UN Security Council Permanent International
Criminal Tribunal (PICT) 3 to bring major perpetrators of international atrocities to
justice.
I.

RECOMMENDATION ONE: RECOGNIZE THE NEED To Do BETTER IN BRINGING
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS To JUSTICE IN A TRIBUNAL OFFERING

GREATER PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIMS AND DEFENDANTS ALIKE

The world's nations, acting through the United Nations, must do a better job
than we have seen to date of bringing justice to perpetrators of war crimes,
genocide, crimes against humanity and other international criminal atrocities. Too
many known perpetrators of horrible international crimes remain at large and may

3. 1 apologize to the Project on International Criminal Courts and Tribunals for selecting the
PICT acronym. It is the best I can come up with for now. Those interested in the Project's invaluable
international law contributions to the study of international criminal courts should access the www.pictpcti.org web site.
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never be tried unless drastic steps are taken. 4 If this situation continues, confidence
in rule of law and justice principles will wane with time and other, more drastic,
means to achieve justice for the victims of5 such crimes could well be attempted to
the detriment of world peace and stability.
I therefore recommend first that we accept the notion that the world must
bring the leaders of international criminal atrocities to justice promptly and fairly.
Starting with Nuremberg and Tokyo, creation of special international courts in
6
response to specific global tragedies has been controversial among scholars. All
too often, a Victor's Justice cry has arisen.
The principal U.S. architect of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Justice Robert
Jackson, noted: "This is the first case I have ever tried when I had first to persuade
others that a Court should be established, help negotiate its establishment, and
when it was done not only prepare my case but find myself a courtroom in which
to try it.

'

Justice Jackson undoubtedly did not see the troubling implications of his
remarks because when he made them the need for Nuremberg's trials was all but
unquestioned.8 Nevertheless, with the benefit of historical hindsight Justice
Jackson's description of creating a legal scheme to try war criminals as he went
along is particularly apt. Even Professor Meltzer, who collaborated with Justice
Jackson at the Nuremberg trials, has suggested that Nuremberg may have operated
on problematic ex post facto legal principles characteristic of what military victors
seems especially applicable to the
often espouse. 9 The "Victor's Justice" problem
10
opinion.
scholarly
on
Tokyo trials, based
4. See generally U.K. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE & THE DEPARTMENT FOR
Annual Report on Human Rights (2005), available at
DEVELOPMENT,

INTERNATIONAL

http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/HumanRights2005.pdf (discussing the current status of international
law as applied to violators of human rights) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005).
5. Gerald E. O'Conner, The Pursuit of Justice and Accountability: Why the United States Should
Support the Establishmentof an InternationalCriminal Court, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 927, 941 (1999).

6. James Crawford, Current Developments: The ILC's Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Tribunal, 88 A.J.I.L. 140, 141 (1994).
7. Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg's Architect and Advocate, 68 ALB. L.
REV. 55, 56 (2004) (quoting Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor, Nuremberg Military High Criminal
Trials).
8. Id. at 60. At least one Jackson contemporary, prominent Republican political figure Robert
Taft, did scathingly attack Nuremberg on ex post facto grounds but his attack was seemingly ignored at
the time. Henry T. King, Robert Jackson's Transcendant Influence Over Today 's World, 68 ALB. L.
REV. 23, 29 (2004); M Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of CriminalJustice: Identifying
internationalProceduralProtections and Equivalent Protectionsin National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 290-91 (1993). Professor Bassiouni noted years ago the protection against ex
post facto laws and punishment as one of the most fundamental international law rights recognized by
most nations.
9 Meltzer, supra note 7, at 60-62.
10. Frances Olsen, Keynote Address, 67 ALB. L. REV. 555, 555-56 (2003); Timothy L.H.
McCormack, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and FutureDevelopments in InternationalLaw: Panel
11: Adjudication Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity: Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of
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The ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were
ad hoc tribunals created by the UN Security Council in response to horrible,
wholesale atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda." They were not supposed to connote
12
Victor's Justice; the Security Council created them on behalf of all world nations.
The ICTY in particular acknowledged fairness problems with the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals, adopting in its initial phase evidentiary and procedural rules
designed to prevent their recurrence.13
Recent reassessments, however, have begun to raise substantial Victor's
Justice perceptions about the Rwanda Tribunal, which was created to address some
of the greatest atrocities in Rwanda and where victims have the greatest need of
justice. 14 This in turn raises the question of whether any ad hoc tribunal created to
hear significant international law cases in one particularized context can fully
assuage reservations about possible Victor's Justice problems.
Moreover, even the ICTY is not free from Victor's Justice stigma; many
Serbs now view Slobodan Milosevic as a victim of justice-run-amok over the
ineffective ICTY handling of his televised trial.' 5 It is also difficult to understand
why many Serbs would not view ICTY as the result of Victor's Justice when the
ICTY was created solely to address acts committed in what many Serbs believe
was rightfully Serbian territory. 16 At a minimum, a permanent tribunal such as the
proposed PITC, with global jurisdiction, undermines, if not eliminates, the basis
for such perceptions. Indeed, one must question whether the Security Council
demonstrated too much selectivity in not creating similar tribunals to address these
kinds of atrocities everywhere they occurred, such as Kuwait. Instead the Security

International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 717-18 (1997); Arthur Thomas O'Reilly, Command
Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles,20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 75-77 (2004).
11. See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in
International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321 (2000) (addressing the importance of
enforcement issues of international criminal through the development of the two current ad hoc
Tribunals in the Hague and Arusha).
12. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in
International Law: Panel II. Adjudication Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and
Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and
the Development of InternationalLaw, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 728-29 (1997); KARINE LESCURE &
FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HAGUE 3-4 (Kluwer International) (1996); M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAs, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 201(Transnational Publishers) (1996); Sherrie L. Russell- Brown, Stefan A.
Riesenfeld Symposium 2002: Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 350, 366-67
(2003).
13. See generally Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Crisis: The Diminution of Live Testimony at the
ICTY, 34 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 47 (2003) (describing this process).
14. Mark A. Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 41,
49 (2005); Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in TransitionalJustice, 2004 J.
Disp. RESOL. 355, 395-97 (2004).
15. Michael P. Scharf, Is It International Enough? A Critique of the Iraqi Special Tribunal in
Light of the Goals of InternationalJustice, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 330, 334-36 (2004).
16. Richard D. Bilder, Kosovo and the New Interventionism: Promise or Peril?,9 J. TRANSNAT'L
LAW& POL'Y 153, 174-75 (1999).
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Council only created them for situations where the Security Council had17the power
to make such tribunals work without resort to significant military force.

II.

RECOMMENDATION Two: RECOGNIZE AND UTILIZE
POWER To REQUIRE COOPERATION WITH THE PICT

SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council should assume the role of creating a single PICT with
jurisdiction over all international acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and such other offenses against the law of nations as the Security Council
chooses. Only the Security Council has the legal power to override an individual
nation's shielding of international criminals and require the national cooperation
necessary for the tribunal to exercise its powers effectively, and most
commentators consider such cooperation crucial for prosecuting (as well as
defending) the cases. 18 Even the ICTY and ICTR have faced difficulties in
obtaining such cooperation from individual states; this may well be attributable in
19
part to the somewhat limited geographical jurisdiction of these two Tribunals.

The atrocities committed in East Timor and Sierra Leone provide two
examples of why there should be a stronger and more direct Security Council
approach to mandating cooperation. In Indonesia the failure to prosecute highranking generals and others who planned the East Timor slaughters may never be
tried in their own country.20 Charles Taylor, wanted by the Sierra Leone Tribunal,
received safe haven in Nigeria with few current prospects of being turned over to
21
As long as these
the tribunals so long as he behaves himself where he is.
who
wish to try them, the
international criminals can thumb their noses at those
world itself becomes a victim of their atrocities. In addition, it has been suggested
that under the current legal regime individual states, and even international bodies,
can and arguably do conceal evidence for the purpose of ensuring pre-ordained
17. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., InternationalObligations to Search for and Arrest War Criminals:
Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 415 (1997).
18. Marieke L. Wierda, What Lessons Can Be Learned From the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals?, 94
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 13, 17-18 (2002); Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminalCourts:
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.INT'L L. 111, 120 (2002); Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of
the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan
National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180-81
(2000).
19. Jenia lontcheva Turner, NationalizingInternationalCriminalLaw, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 12
(2005).
20. See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 301, 401-18 (2003) (noting Indonesian judicial unwillingness and inability to
pursue prosecution); See Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals: Searchingfor Justice in East
Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 259, 271-75 (2003).
21. Tom Briody, Defending War Crimes in Africa: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, THE
at
available
(2005,
34
Jan/Feb.
CHAMPION,
http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsf/PrinterFriendly/A0502p34?openDocument (last visited Nov.
29, 2005); James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 635-36 (2005); See generally Micaela Frulli, The Question of Charles
Taylor's Immunity - Still in Search of a Balanced Application of Personal Immunities?, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1118 (2004) (pointing out that Taylor may never be transferred to the Sierra Leone Court
based on his status as Liberia's head of state and the immunity this status may have given him when he
allegedly committed or ordered commission of the atrocities in Sierra Leone he has been charged with).

VOL. 34:1

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

international tribunal case outcomes. 2 Only the Security Council could effectively
address this problem.
I1.

RECOMMENDATION

THREE:

TRY

THE CASES

WHERE

THE

ATROCITIES

OCCURRED

The proposed PICT should adjudicate cases and otherwise function as a
complete criminal court for both trial and appellate purposes entirely within the
countries where the criminal atrocities occurred, absent very extraordinary
circumstances (limited to cataclysmic acts of nature or war which destroy a
country's infrastructure). In other words, the PICT would have mandatory local
venues to bring the machinery of law and justice to the victims, evidence and
perpetrators, so those involved in and affected by these criminal acts can see for
themselves that these international courts are not remote, impersonal entities.
There is probably no other way to bring credible justice directly to the people who
deserve it.
As former ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour has commented, "Only in
extraordinary circumstances would courts grant a change of venue for a criminal
trial to be held in a different jurisdiction. 23 She aptly describes the problem of
having international criminal courts located in venues remote from where the
crimes are committed and stresses the necessity of bringing criminal justice
locally. 24 Perhaps most significantly, the failure to localize these trials severely
compromises the ability of the prosecutor to help shape local perceptions of how
the machinery of justice is actually functioning in these cases. 25 Louise Arbour
26
emphatically urges that "we have to be able to bring criminal justice locally.,
Professor Jose E. Alvarez further notes, "The lesson we should be drawing from
Rwanda is that attention to domestic processes . . . [is] vital to the prospects for
restoring the rule of law when it matters most: that is within the communities and
nations devastated by mass atrocities. 27
Perhaps most tellingly, Professor Alvarez points out that "trials are
undermined and not merely rendered more difficult the greater the distance
between their venue and the location of witnesses and evidence., 28 Localizing
22. Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminal Courts: Difficulties and Prospects,27 YALE J.INT'L
L. 111, 121-27 (2002) (discussing various ICTY cases); See also Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the
Milosevic Trial, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 915, 929 (2003) (discussing ICTY witness subpoena
limitations).
23. Louise Arbour, The Status of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 45 (1999); See also Chandra Lekha
Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to PastAbuses, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 301,
398-99 (2003) (suggesting ICTR is too remote from the Rwandan people to have meaningful impact in
the country).
24. Louise Arbour, The Status of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37, 44-6 (1999).
25. Id. at 45-6.
26. Id. at 45.
27. Jose E. Alvarez, Lessons From the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359, 366
(1999).
28. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate:Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L.
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these trials and their appeals appears to be essential for serving the ends of justice
to the benefit of all concerned.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION

FOUR:

CREATE

A

STRONG

PICT

SECURITY

AND

PROTECTION FORCE

The Security Council should approve the creation of, and oversee, a welltrained international judicial security and protection force able to ensure judge,
prosecutor, defendant, defense counsel, victim and witness safety. As an
international security force controlled by the PICT directly, this new body would
have the authority to cross national borders and perform duties as set forth in its
stated powers. Individual nations would be required to cooperate with this body,
and discretion not to do so would be limited. Witness protection has been a
particularly difficult problem in international tribunal cases to date because this
requires cooperation of national governments prone to citing national security
concerns as a basis for imposing barriers to performing this core function. 29 This
30
must be corrected for the benefit of defendants and victims alike.
V.

RECOMMENDATION

FIVE:

OFFER

MORE AND

BETTER

PROTECTION

OF

DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS

The new PICT must reverse the all-too-marked trend of other international
criminal tribunals to gravitate towards the lowest common denominator in the rules
and procedures applicable to protecting defendant rights. I share the view of the
late Monroe Leigh that any international or national court created to try war
criminals and other international human rights violators must "establish itself as
the preeminent defender of... the right of every accused to a fair trial according to
the most exacting standards of due process required by contemporary international
law.",3 1 Instead of adhering to the "most exacting" standards of defendant rights,
however, serious problems seem to afflict all of the international and national
tribunals to date on fundamental defendant rights. As one commentator has noted,
"[t]here has been relatively little interest in the rights of the accused before

365, 404 (1999).
29. Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminal Courts: Difficulties and Prospects,27 YALE J.INT'L
L. 111, 118021 (2002).
30. See generally Fatema E. Fallahnejad Burkey, Recent Development: The Prosecutor V.
Aleksovski, 30 May 2001, Judgment on Appeal by Anto Nobilo Against Finding of Contempt: A Critical
Analysis of the ICTY Appeals Chamber's Abandonment of Witness ProtectionMeasures, 82 WASH. U.

L.Q. 297 (2004 (discussing the public policy supporting witness protection measures). For a different
kind of witness protection problem involving vulnerable populations such as children, see Stuart
Beresford, Child Witnesses and the International Criminal Justice System Does the International
Criminal Court Protects the Most Vulnerable?, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 721 (2005).

31. Monroe Leigh, Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (1996); See generally Fairlie, supra note 12 (discussing the
Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence and their effect on trials); See also Andrew J. Walker, When
a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented How the InternationalCriminal CourtFails to be Insulated From
InternationalPolitics and to ProtectBasic Due Process Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245, 259-62

(2004).
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international criminal courts," and fair trials are often all but impossible because of
32
serious evidentiary problems in these cases.
For example, despite endemic problems with evidentiary hearsay use in
almost all these cases, the widespread use of hearsay continues.33 In addition,
ready access to release on bail has proved elusive for many defendants in
contravention of well-established international human rights law obligations. The
notion of speedy trials is also a fiction in many of these cases, as is the right to
competent defense counsel.34 The use of anonymous witnesses must cease and can
do so with the creation of a viable witness protection security force. The need for
these reforms is evident based on norms of international human rights. Often
overlooked is the international law obligation for courts to apply international law
35
principles in protection of the rights of criminal defendants, as discussed below.
A. The Right To Confront Witnesses & The HearsayProblem
One of the most polemic themes involving international criminal tribunals to
date has involved the use of anonymous witnesses, which involves hearsay
problems that call into question the fairness of the underlying trials. 36 That this has
been an issue at all seems surprising, given the international human rights
obligations appearing to require that defendants have access to witnesses at trial. 37
Nonetheless, hearsay evidence derived from anonymous witnesses appears to have
become the norm rather than the exception in important international cases to
date. 38 The creators of the ICTY and ICTR relied upon different sources of
international law. 39 This in turn resulted in a belief among the tribunal judges

32. Cogan, supra note 29, at 112.
33. Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,
Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725,745-47 (1999).
34. Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International
Criminal Tribunalforthe Former Yugoslavia 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 111, 117-18 (1998).
35. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, Report of the
InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 60, Comm., 5 6 th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43-44, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (defining wrongful state acts according to
international law and imposing this obligation on the courts).
36. See Monroe Leigh, Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 235-38 (1996); See, e.g., David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An
Historical & Comparative Analysis of Secret Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361,
413-20 (2002); See also Kellye L. Fabian, Note and Comment, Proofand Consequences: An Analysis
of the Tadic and Akayesu Trials, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (2000) (analyzing problems of anonymous
witnesses).
37. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (requiring fair and public hearings for all defendants) [hereinafter
UDHR]; See also International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring fair and public hearings and guaranteeing the right of defendants to examine all
witnesses) [hereinafter ICCPR].
38. See, e.g., David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & ComparativeAnalysis of Secret
Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361 (2002); See generally Theodor Meron, Editorial
Comment, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of InternationalHumanitarian Law, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (1996) (examining the creation of customary law in international humanitarian
law).
39. See Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal
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themselves that there was a rationale for their decisions somewhere in international
law.4 ° Judge Wald explains the history of the use of hearsay evidence in the ICTY
quite clearly: "There has never been a bar against hearsay in ICTY trials."' 1 The
ICC likewise has no hearsay bar.42 These legal realities, however, do not justify
their application.
In his majority opinion, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia provides a detailed
history of hearsay evidence and the U.S. Constitution's witness confrontation
clause in Crawford v. Washington.43 He demonstrates that the ban against most
hearsay and a criminal defendant's right to confront all witnesses whose testimony
will be used by the prosecution reflects not merely a U.S. - British common law
principle, but also a civil law rule dating back to the Romans. 44 A primary purpose
of this rule appears to be an inherent distrust of granting judges too much
discretion in admitting criminal case evidence:
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost good faith
when they found reliability. The Framers [of the U.S. Constitution], however,
would not have been content to indulge this assumption. They knew that judges,
like other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights
of the people .... They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. 45
One international commentator has observed:
Two thousand years ago witness anonymity was rejected by the
ancient Romans, founders of the adversarial system of criminal trial, as
a matter of basic principle. Informing the accused of the identity of his
or her accusers was recognised as an elementary requirement of fairness
and indispensable safeguard against wrongful conviction. At various
times and places throughout history it has been argued that
countervailing considerations may justify depriving the accused of this
rudimentary right. On occasion, these arguments have succeeded, yet

Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591, 599-601 (1998); See
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); See also S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
40. Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 237, 238-39
(2002).
41. Patricia M. Wald, Rules of Evidence in the Yugoslav War Tribunal, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
761,768 (2003); See generally Patricia M. Wald, To "'Establish Incredible Events by Credible
Evidence ": The Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 535 (2001) (discussing how the ICTY moves further away from the Anglo-American model
which permits very limited use of written substitutes for live testimony).
42. Andrew J. Walker, When a Good Idea Is Poorly Implemented: How the International
Criminal Court Fails to be Insulated From International Politics and to Protect Basic Due Process
Guarantees, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 245, 278 (2004)..
43. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
44. Id. at 43.
45. Id. at 67 (other citations omitted).
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history's judgment of such occasions has been damning. A key lesson
anonymity is an open invitation to perjury,
from the past is that witness
46
injustice and oppression.

I share this commentator's view that whatever the virtue of hearsay evidence
and witness anonymity, including the expedition of trials and witness protections,
this approach reflects "a cure worse than the disease. ' 47 The PICT should heed
these warnings and concerns by adopting rules against such practices.
B. The Right to Bail and PromptBail Hearings
One of the great travesties characterizing international criminal cases to date,

has been disregard for the right to bail, accompanied by the parallel right to a quick
48
As one commentator correctly notes, "Internationally accepted
bail hearing.
standards of human rights require that persons accused of a crime should be
released from detention pending their trial and the ... adjudication by a court of
49
It is thus inexplicable that
law of their guilt or innocence wherever possible.
international defendants who can afford bail and have nowhere to flee are
nonetheless not allowed bail while on trial. The ICTY and the ICTR have
rendered various decisions to the effect that pre-trial release on bail should be the
exception rather than the rule.50 The PICT should generally require reasonable bail
as a condition for all defendants, with only evidence of likely flight as the most

applicable exception.51
C. The Right to Prompt Trials

Even more problematic than the lack of bail opportunities is the inability of
international criminal tribunals to date, especially the ICTR, to bring defendants to
52
trial rapidly, in contravention of international law obligations to do so. Although
46. David Lusty, Anonymous Accusers: An Historical & Comparative Analysis of Secret
Witnesses in Criminal Trials, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 361, 423 (2002).
47. Id. at 424.
48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71,
U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (guaranteeing right to liberty); International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9.1, 9.3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (guaranteeing defendants the rights to liberty, to
be brought promptly before the court to be charged, and generally to release on bail). For a discussion
of an international legal right to bail, see Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive Detention: A Comparison of
Bail Refusal Practicesin the United States, England, Canada and Other Common Law Nations, 8 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 399 (1996).

49. Christopher Lehmann, Bail Reform in Ukraine: Transplanting Western Legal Concepts-to
Post Soviet Legal Systems, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 193 (2000).
50. Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the
Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 77-78 (1999); Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged
Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 577, 577-79 (2003); Matthew M.
DeFrank, Student Commentary, ICTY + Provisional Release: Current Practice, a Dissenting Voice,
and the Casefor a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1430-31 (2002).
51. Conditioning bail denial on flight risk seems to be a reasonably well-established international
law principle. See Jeffery A. Hall, Note, A Recommended Approach to Bail in InternationalExtradition
Cases, 86 MICH. L. REV. 599, 599-600 (1987).
52. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9.3, 14.3, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (guaranteeing the right to be brought to trial within a reasonable time); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying international Procedural
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recognizing the often extreme difficulties in gathering forensic evidence needed to
bring such cases to trial,53 one must nonetheless wonder why defendants often wait
for years before their trials begin; all too often they wait for years while
incarcerated. Even the ICTR Appellate Chamber has recognized this problem on
occasion and ordered release of a defendant because of excessive detention and
trial delay, but again, this appears to be the exception instead of the rule.54 This
state of affairs is not acceptable, and the PICT should impose rigorous trial
deadlines for all cases brought before it.
D. The Right to Competent Defense Counsel
Access to competent defense counsel for international tribunal defendants, a
fundamental right in international law, has been problematic and subject to concern
by commentators. 5 It can only be hoped that by having one international tribunal
linked to the Security Council, a standardized approach to setting quality,
competency and resource criteria available to defense counsel and prosecutors on
an even-handed basis can result.
VI. RECOMMENDATION SIX: CREATE A GREATER IMPACT BY PROSECUTING ONLY
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS, BUT Do SO PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY

In assessing all the current international tribunals' productivity to date, it
appears that too much money has been spent on too few results, despite my own
initial views while visiting the ICTY that the expense was going to be worth it. As
of 2004 more than $1 billion had been spent by the ICTY and ICTR together on
several dozen cases involving well under 100 defendants.56 Adding to this figure
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235,
285-86 (1993) (recognizing international right to a speedy trial); See also Eric Husketh, Note and
Comment, Pole Pole: Hastening Justice at UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 8, 1-2 (2005);
Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: ProvisionalRelease at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J.
577, 577-78 (2003); Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda and the Rwandan NationalJustice System in Dealing with
the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 181-84 (2000) (all discussing ICTR backlogs).
53. Some of my former students who conducted forensic investigations in Bosnia as UN law
enforcement experts have done riveting class presentations on this topic in my Public International Law
course. Data on file with author.
54. Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass
Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180-81 (2000) (discussing Barayagurza appeal); But see
Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminal Courts. Difficulties and Prospects,27 YALE J.INT'L L. I11,
134-35 (2002) at 134-35 (describing reversal of the initial appellate decision in the same case).
55. ICCPR Article 14 appears to guarantee all defendants a right to counsel, presumptively
competent, and at no expense to indigent defendants. For a discussion of Article 14 counsel rights, see
Joshua E. Kastenberg, Universal Jurisdictionand the Concept of a Fair Trial Prosecutorv. Fulgence
Niyonteze: A Swiss Military Tribunal Case Study, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 27-32
(2004). For discussions of defense counsel competency problems in international tribunals, see David
Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel: A Troubled Relationship, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 975 (2003);
Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law, Note, Fair Trials and the Role of International
CriminalDefense, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1982, 1983 (2001).
56. Daryl A. Mundis, Note and Comment, The JudicialEffects of the "Completion Strategies " of
the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM .J. INT'L L. 142, 142 (2005); See also Eric
Husketh, Note and Comment, Pole Pole: HasteningJustice at UNICTR, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS.
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the costs of other international criminal tribunals (such as the Sierra Leone Special
Court, the ICC, East Timor, etc.), which have yielded few tangible results to date,
and the numbers become even more stark. 57 It is perhaps time to admit this and
assess objectively how the PICT, backed up by a well-trained security force, can
begin bringing major perpetrators of international crimes to justice rapidly and less
expensively. There is no reason why a properly constituted tribunal security force,
backed by Security Council legal powers, cannot find and bring all major
international criminals to justice, because no nation could lawfully shield them.
Assuming that the primary ICTY fugitives or others, such as Charles Taylor hiding
in Nigeria, would qualify for major offender status before the new tribunal, the
Security Council could effectively order all nations harboring such individuals to
turn them over to the tribunal security force, which would have entry and arrest
powers in these states.
VII. RECOMMENDATION SEVEN: APPLY
NEEDED FOR THE TRIBUNAL To FUNCTION

ALL

SECURITY

COUNCIL

POWERS

Simply stated, a state's failure to cooperate could trigger up to the full range
of sanctions authorized by the UN Charter.58 The Security Council must be
prepared to take all measures needed to bring those formally charged to justice in
the interest of addressing bona fide threats to international peace and security.
These measures must necessarily include sanctions and even limited use of force,
as needed. Permitting war criminals to live safely beyond legal reach may well
constitute one of the world's greatest non-armed conflict threats to peace and
security, by sending the message that those who commit egregious war crimes and
other atrocities need not fear the consequences as long as they burrow into the right
safe holes. For example, an aggressive approach in Indonesia would almost
certainly achieve meaningful results in isolating the ringleaders of East Timor
atrocities from the Indonesian people. It would also likely bring Charles Taylor to
justice before the tribunal, if being before the tribunal is where he belonged.
Moreover, even the fugitives currently evading ICTY reach would likely find their
protection evaporated in the face of a professional, committed PICT security force
backed by truly sharp Security Council teeth. 9

8, 17-18 (2005), at 17-18 (discussing ICTR costs).
57. For an excellent analysis of international criminal justice cost issues, see James Cockayne, The
Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 635-36

(2005).
58. The UN Charter, Chapter VII, Articles 39-42, authorizes imposition of a full range of
economic, military and other measures; Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator":
Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 542 (2005); Christopher Joyner, Reconciling
Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade: United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: Looking
Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329, 330-32 (2003).

59. Interestingly, now that both the ICTY and the ICTR are under Security Council mandates to
complete their work and go out of existence by December 31, 2008 and 2010, respectively, the pressure
is on to get these major fugitives apprehended and tried, with the Security Council identifying full
cooperation by all states as essential to its accomplishment; See also Daryl A. Mundis, Note and
Comment, The Judicial Effects of the "Completion Strategies" of the Ad Hoc International Criminal
Tribunals,99 AM .J. INT'L L. 142, 143-45 (2005) for wind-down discussion.
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RECOMMENDATION EIGHT: DEFINE ALL PICT OFFENSES CAREFULLY To
No DOUBT ABOUT WHICH OFFENSES AND WHICH INDIVIDUALS MAY BE

TRIED

The Security Council should define the offenses within PICT jurisdiction
carefully to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, because
these international offenses, along with their judicial applications, are by now
reasonably well-established under international law. By moving quickly to do so,
the Security Council can perhaps head off charges of ex post facto justice which
have plagued almost every one of the international criminal tribunals created since
Nuremberg and Tokyo.60 One argument espoused by commentators and the ICTY
itself confronts the ex post facto critics by pointing out that a new international
tribunal may validly apply customary international laws existing at the time of the
tribunal's creation; furthermore, application of well-established customary
international law offenses such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity would not seem to offend too many due process notions. 6 1 On the other
hand, the Security Council can decide this issue directly when it establishes the
PICT and defines PICT jurisdiction by determining whether to apply only
prospective jurisdiction to offenses committed after PICT creation.
IX. RECOMMENDATION NINE: RECONCILE PICT POWERS AND ACTIVITIES WITH
THOSE OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, NATIONAL TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONS, AND THE ICC.

PICT powers and activities should be reconciled with those of national courts,
national truth and reconciliation commissions, and the ICC. Because I propose
having the PICT try only major criminals, it must be assumed that national courts
or the handful of remaining hybrid multinational courts such as the one for Sierra
Leone would try most of the rest.62 One of the more justifiable criticisms of both
the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as the Sierra Leone Special Court, is their
collective incompatibility with national justice systems and inability to help those
systems in emerging nations develop more effectively. 63 Although lip service has
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
61. See generally L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Post-War Iraq: ProsecutingSaddam Hussein, 7 CAL.
CRIM. L.REv. 1 (2004) (suggesting that subjecting Saddam Hussein to trial by a UN-created

international tribunal would not be ex post facto justice because he would be tried for offenses wellestablished under customary international law); Carol T. Fox, Note, Closing a Loophole in
Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commanders' Duty to Punish Known Past Offenses, 55
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 443, 463-68 (2004);Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72,
Decision of Appeals Chamber on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber.
62. Professor Ellis estimated about a year ago that at least 30 national courts with international
war crimes and related offense jurisdiction had been created. Mark S. Ellis, Coming to Terms with Its
Past - Serbia'sNew Courtfor the Prosecution of War Crimes, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2004).
For a review of hybrid tribunals, see Laura A. Dickinson, Note and Comment, The Promise of Hybrid
Courts, 97 A.J.I.L. 295 (2003).
63. James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 650-54 (2005); Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining JudicialRescues: The Role
of Outreach and Capacity-BuildingEfforts and War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005);
David Tolbert, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes
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been paid to this issue, at least occasionally, the PICT should receive both the
mandate and the resources to perform this vital function.
Another issue requiring careful consideration is that of complimentarity.
Because the PICT would only have jurisdiction over those defendants deemed to
be major international criminals, national courts would have plenty of defendants
to try. I am inclined to grant primacy to the PICT over national courts in deciding
who should try which defendants. As discussed below, I also recommend allowing
the Security Council itself to be the sole PICT case referral source, and this would
necessarily effectuate case-by-case complementarity review as a practical matter.
I also propose codifying the legitimacy of national truth and reconciliation
commissions in the PICT's governance powers, at least for the purpose of
authorizing PICT cooperation with them, in order to end the incessant debate over
whether these commissions should exist. 64 Although it must be left up to each
country to decide for itself whether to have such a commission following a
national catastrophe of human rights abuses, South Africa's experience plus other
historical examples such as Chile's experience demonstrate the value of these
commissions in ending strife. Rather than ignore them, the PICT should be
required to work closely with these commissions to make them more effective, and
then be given the resources to do this effectively.
The PICT's relationship with the ICC will require careful attention. Although
many may argue that the ICC should be the new tribunal, it is increasingly
improbable that major powers such as the United States, China and Russia, as well
as India and Japan, will become part of the ICC. 65 The United States has made
clear its position that it Will not support the ICC for numerous reasons that are
unlikely to change.66 As long as the United States maintains this position, other
permanent Security Council members are likewise free to do so and probably will.
Accepting this as a reality, the PICT eliminates the basis for such objections
because the Security Council members themselves would control it as a Security
and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7 (2002); But see David Tolbert,
Reflections on the ICTY Registry, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 480, 484 (2004) (discussing subsequent ICTY
outreach successes).
64. Cockayne, supra note 20 at 540-44, nn. 533-50 (discussing problems between the Sierra
Leone Special Court and the Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission); Laurie King-Irani, To
Reconcile, or Be Reconciled?: Agency, Accountability, and Law in Middle Eastern Conflicts, 28
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 369 (2005); Julissa Mantilla Falcon, The Peruvian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission 's Treatment of Sexual Violence Against Women, 12 HUM. RTS. BR. 1
(2005); Jonathan Simon, ParrhesiasticAccountability: Investigatory Commissions and Executive
Power in an Age of Terror, 114 YALE L.J. 1419, 1451-54 (2005) (noting the creation and functioning
of at least 21 commissions to date).
65. Talitha Gray, Note: To Keep You is no Gain, to Kill You is no Loss: Securing Justice through
the InternationalCriminal Court, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 645, 651-58 (2003).
66. William H. Taft, IV, The Eighteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in InternationalLaw, 184 MIL.
L. REV. 174, 182-84 (2005). For U.S. Congressional Committee Reports describing U.S. opposition,h
h
REP. NO. 62, 1071
see H.R. REP. NO. 593, 107" Cong., 2d Sess., Secs. 2001-2015 (2002); H.R.
Cong., I Sess., Secs. 632-642 (2001). For a detailed analysis of U.S. objections, see John Seguin,
Note, Denouncing the InternationalCriminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the Rome
Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85 (2000).
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Council organ. There is reason to believe the United States would support such a
measure 67 and if it does, other major countries presently unwilling to become part
of the ICC might well follow suit. This is not to say that the ICC would have no
role or existence. Statute of Rome parties are always free, if they wish, to
cooperate with the ICC, and the new PICT should also be expressly empowered to
do so in its governing instruments. On the other hand, as with national courts and
major criminals, the PICT should have primacy over the ICC because the former
would be created as the world's supreme criminal judicial body.
X.

RECOMMENDATION TEN:

FUND THE PICT AND PUT IT To WORK Now

The PICT should be funded and get started immediately by targeting ten to
twelve at-large persons deemed the most egregious international criminal law
violators. There will, of course, be a number of substantive and procedural legal
issues to resolve in creating the PICT: judges and staff selection; defining the
powers of the PICT security and protection force; deciding on a PICT headquarters
location; defining major criminals for PICT jurisdictional purposes; debating the
Security Council case referral process in establishing the Security Council as the
sole referring body for submitting persons to be investigated and tried; and,
determining where sentences are to be served. These decisions need not take too
much time, however, because the groundwork for many of them has already been
laid out in the ICTY and ICTR governing instruments, as well as in the ICC
offense definitions.68 Moreover, the Security Council is more than capable of
setting appropriate parameters for its own international criminal tribunal in a
manner which balances the need for international justice with sensitivity to
international political realities. The Security Council has already demonstrated its
ability and willingness to do so in connection with the ICC, by referring the Sudan
Darfur matter to that body.69
CONCLUSION

Not all would agree that the Security Council should have the role of
determining PICT cases. 70 The countervailing argument, however, is that three
Security Council permanent member states outside the ICC would immediately

67. William H. Taft, IV, The Eighteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in InternationalLaw, 184 MIL.

L. REV. 174, 182-84 (2005) (citing lack of Security Council control as a main U.S. objection to the
ICC); Seguin, supra note 66, at 92-97 (discussing Security Council issues in context of U.S.
objections).
68. Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 A.J.I.L. 452, 453-54
(1999).
69. For sources regarding both the ICC case referral and the Darfur situation generally, see HansPeter Kaul, Developments at the InternationalCriminal Court: Construction Site for More Justice: The

InternationalCriminal Court After Two Years, 99 A.J.I.L. 370, 380-83 (2005); Mario Cava et al,
Updatesfor the InternationalCriminal Courts, 12 HUM. RTS. BR. 37 (2005); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur
and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 (2005); Linnea D. Manashaw, Comment,
Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why the Distinction?: A Discussion in the Context of Atrocities
Occurringin Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 303 (2005); Jamal Jafari, "Never Again" Again: Darfur,
the Genocide Convention and the Duty to Prevent Genocide, 12 HUM. RTS. BR. 8 (2004).
70. Richard J. Goldstone, The Failure of International Justice, 57 ME. L. REV. 553 (2005)
(rejecting Security Council judicial gatekeeper role).
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start participating in the international criminal justice system in an ongoing,
permanent process. Perhaps more importantly, the votes of the Security Council
on what to do with the cases would establish for the record each member's
commitment, or lack thereof, to bringing the world's worst villains to justice. By
creating a permanent tribunal with real legal teeth and power, the Security Council
will demonstrate once and for all its views towards permanent international law,
justice and common sense.

